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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper contributes to two important current policy concerns. The first is the 
concern with the slow rate of growth of productivity in Europe compared to the US, 
especially the contribution to this sluggish performance of the European retail sector. 
The second is the growing evidence in both the US and the UK that land use 
regulation often imposes significant economic costs.  
 
Introductory economics tells us there are three factors of production: land, labour and 
capital. Unless a student of agricultural economics, land as a factor of production will 
likely never be mentioned again. Yet space for some industries is a significant input 
and that would seem to be true of retailing. This is a sizable sector of all OECD 
economies. On a reasonable measure of size – employment – it is the second largest 
industry in the UK.  Land use regulation in the UK intentionally restricts the 
availability of land for retail. In English cities in the mid-1980s the most expensive 
land for retail cost 250 times as much as the most expensive retail land in comparable 
US cities (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1986). In addition, English – Scotland and 
Northern Ireland are different – ‘Town Centre First’ (TCF) policies concentrate retail 
development on particular sites in central locations.  
 
The control exercised on the number of sites is also likely to introduce a specific 
barrier to entry into new markets. As was shown by Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) and 
by Schivardi and Viviano (2011) such barriers to entry alone can significantly reduce 
supermarket employment or productivity at least in the cases respectively of France 
and Italy. 
 
The British system of land use planning has explicitly aimed to ‘contain’ urban areas 
since 1947. It imposes direct restrictions on the supply of land for each, legally 
defined, category of use. This increases the cost of space in all categories of 
development: notably residential, commercial, wholesale, industrial and retail. 
Obviously the greater is demand for land for a particular use in a particular location, 
the greater will be the price given this fiat-determined supply of land. Over the past 20 
years a literature has developed analysing the economic effects of these restrictions. 
Most of this work has related to the residential sector but more recently studies have 
begun to analyse the costs in other sectors.  
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Cheshire and Hilber (2008), for example, examined the office sector and concluded 
that British land use regulation (planning) imposed additional costs substantially 
higher than in any other country for which it was possible to get the requisite data. 
Even in a depressed provincial city such as Birmingham restrictive planning policies 
generated the equivalent of a tax on marginal construction costs of 250 percent 
averaged over 1999-2005. In London’s West End this regulatory tax was estimated to 
have averaged 800 percent over the same period. In 2005 total occupation costs for 
office space in Birmingham were some 44 percent higher than in Manhattan. Given 
that land is a relatively more important input into retail than into office-based 
activities, first principles and the observed price of land for retail use in Britain 
suggest such costs may be significantly greater in the retail sector. Not only do 
general containment policies restrict the supply of land for retail but, particularly 
since 1996 in England, rigid TCF policies have micromanaged retail to specific sites 
in designated ‘town centres’ and virtually prohibited large scale out-of-town retail 
development.  
 
Griffith and Harmgart (2008) and Haskel and Sadun (2009) provided the first 
academic attempts to analyse the economic impact of British planning policies on the 
retail sector. Their work was consistent with the less rigorously based conclusions of 
the McKinsey Global Institute (1998) who argued that by preventing the emergence 
of more productive, large format stores and by increasing the costs of space, planning 
policy was seriously impeding the growth of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in the 
UK retail sector. Perhaps overlooked, because hidden in a detailed appendix, is the 
work of the Competition Commission (2008, Appendix 4.4). They had full access to a 
very wide range of store specific data for the four main supermarket groups for the 
period May 2005 to May 2006 covering store sizes from 280 to 6,000 m2. Their 
analysis produced very strong evidence of the importance (and statistical significance) 
of store size to profitability and productivity – see for example the results reported in 
Table 6 of Competition Commission (2008, Appendix 4.4).  
 
The contribution of the present work is that, unlike previous academic researchers we 
have access to a wide range of individual store level data complete with full locational 
details. We also have full planning decision data for all English local authorities from 
1979 to 2008 which allows us to analyse the impact of cross sectional variation in 
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planning restrictiveness within England. Furthermore the significant difference in 
both timing and restrictiveness of TCF policies in England compared to other 
countries of the UK helps us identify the specific impact of TCF policies on store 
output. 
 
An earlier report, Competition Commission (2000), devoted considerable space to the 
role of the planning system as a drag on competition in the grocery/supermarket 
sector and collected a vast quantity of useful and relevant data. Appendix 12.7 of this 
report, for example, contains careful comparisons of land costs for retail development 
in various Continental European countries calibrated on a basis as far as possible 
comparable with those in the UK. The principles of urban economics predict that land 
costs for any given use will fall with distance from the centre of a city and also fall as 
city size falls. According to the Competition Commission (2000, Appendix 12.7), 
land costs in France followed this spatial pattern. Estimates for Germany and the 
Netherlands produced similar spatial patterns and also comparable land values to 
those reported for France. Average land costs in Britain were five to ten times higher 
than those in France and declined with neither city size nor distance from city centres.  
 
Thus we already have strong evidence that productivity in supermarkets increases 
with store size, other things equal, and that land and space costs in Britain are an order 
of magnitude higher than those in Continental European countries and a further order 
of magnitude greater than in the US (though here the existing evidence is old). From 
other work on the impacts of land use planning policy on the costs of space in Britain 
it may be reasonable to assume that (i) the inflated land costs are caused by planning 
policies, (ii) direct controls on store sites and sizes in combination with higher 
planning induced-land costs cause the substitution of space out of production, and (iii) 
these factors are jointly responsible for reducing output and productivity in the sector. 
But to date the link to planning policies is more circumstantial than conclusive and the 
most rigorous estimation of the quantitative impact of planning policies on retail 
productivity (Haskel and Sadun, 2009) is based on firm rather than store level data. 
Nevertheless, their estimates suggest a loss of 0.4 percent p.a. in TFP growth from 
1997 to 2003. 
 
It is the purpose of this paper to address both the wider issue of output loss and the 
particular issue of causation. As noted above we do this in large part by exploiting the 
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difference in timing of the introduction and in the rigor of application of TCF policies 
in England compared to Northern Ireland and Scotland, utilising a Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) approach. In addition, however, we use an Instrumental Variables 
approach to try to pin down causation between variation in local restrictiveness and 
foregone output. 
 
Underlying our analysis is the estimation of a production function explained in detail 
in Section V. Some of the impacts of planning policies will affect TFP while others, 
such as more expensive land, may only influence the productivity of particular factors 
– chiefly labour. We explain in detail how we interpret the various impacts we 
observe on specific forms of productivity in the discussion of equation (2) in Section 
V. All our measured impacts are in the form of foregone output but in what follows – 
unless we specifically qualify it – we use  the term ‘productivity’ in a general sense to 
include both TFP and the productivity of a specific factor or factors. 
 
It should be stressed that we are attempting to quantify only the costs of planning 
policies – not the value of any benefits that they may produce although we briefly 
discuss this issue in the concluding section. It is our view that at least knowing “the 
prices on menus” is helpful information and at present we have powerful and 
influential planning policies without any measure of their economic costs. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly sets out the key elements of British 
planning policies with respect to retail and summarises some of the findings so far as 
to their effects. The next section establishes more formally our hypotheses and our 
methodological approach, especially with respect to identifying the causal processes 
at work and the specific role of planning policies. Section IV describes the data we 
use. Section V presents the main analysis and an estimation of output losses from 
three main sources: higher space costs; direct controls on store sizes; and 
micromanagement of store locations to particular sites in town centres – although we 
cannot differentiate here between this and barriers to entry created by policy. The 
estimates are based on two alternative approaches, one more conservative the other 
perhaps more realistic. The final section summarises conclusions and policy 
implications. 
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II. EXISTING LAND USE POLICIES:  
THEIR EVOLUTION AND SOME IMPACTS 
 
We need to know something of the particular form and timing of planning policies 
and how they are implemented if we are to develop useful hypotheses as to their 
economic impact. There are useful and significant differences, both in the precise 
form and the timing, of policies for retail as between England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. While policy in Wales has tended to follow that in England rather 
closely, differences between these two countries and Northern Ireland and Scotland 
are significant. Although there are national guidelines for policy for each country of 
the UK its implementation is initially the responsibility of local jurisdictions – Local 
Planning Authorities (LPAs). As discussed below, LPAs in England vary 
considerably in the restrictiveness with which they interpret national policies. In all 
four UK countries planning policies are implemented by means of ‘development 
control’ – that is, each proposed development1 is considered individually by the LPA 
and is then either permitted or refused (in contrast to systems in force in the USA or 
continental Europe where what plans permit can be built). There is then a process of 
appeal against local decisions. 
 
The key details of retail sector planning policies as they have developed since 1947 in 
each country of the UK are summarised in what follows. The basic features of 
Britain’s land use planning system were set in the 1947 Town and Country Planning 
Act. This expropriated development rights, introduced categories of land use defined 
in statute; provided for local plans and the process of development control; and most 
importantly allocated urban land between each legal use category and established 
‘urban envelopes’ or ‘growth boundaries’. It also provided for Greenbelts but the 
boundaries of these were delimited during the 1950s as local plans were prepared. 
 
Thus even in the mid-1980s the UK had had a system of supply constraints for land, 
acting independently of prices, for more than a generation. The construction of the 
                                                 
1
 Development has a legal meaning. It does not necessarily involve constructing anything but includes 
changes of use between legal ‘Use Classes’. So a proposal to change the use of an existing shop from 
selling say books to selling houses would constitute ‘development’ and would need to be considered 
via the process of ‘development control’ by the relevant LPA. 
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motorway (highway) system from about 1960, growth of car ownership and use2 
associated with residential decentralisation, created strong forces favouring the 
development of out-of-town, large format supermarkets and shopping centres. Policy 
makers responded specifically to restrict such developments in England from 1988. 
 
England:   
1988 – Policy which had previously accepted the commercial logic of out-of-town 
retail changed in 1988 to direct new out-of-town retail development to Brownfield or 
‘regeneration sites’; 
1993 – Policy was changed to positively direct new retail development to town 
centres on the grounds that the free market would ‘under provide’ in-town retail 
development (ODPM, 2004);   
1996 – Strict Town Centre First policy was introduced in PPG6 (PPG stands for 
Planning Policy Guidance, replaced with Planning Policy Statements, now abolished 
and incorporated in the National Planning Policy Framework) (Department of the 
Environment, 1996). This, crucially, brought in both the ‘needs’ and ‘sequential’ tests 
and dropped any mention of ‘avoiding unnecessary regulation’. The ‘needs’ test 
required the potential developer to demonstrate, according to prescribed formulae, 
that the community ‘needed’ more shopping space and that their proposed 
development would not undermine the viability of other local shopping facilities. It 
can be argued this erected a barrier to entry into local markets. The ‘sequential’ test 
was designed to rule out all possible sites before allowing an out-of-town site even to 
be considered. A potential developer had to show that suitable sites in ‘town centres’ 
were not available and, subsequently, that sites in a ‘district centre’ or ‘neighbourhood 
centre’ were also not available before proposing to develop an edge-of or out-of town 
site. A site was only defined as ‘suitable’ if it was identified for retail use in the local 
plan. The fact that such a site might be owned by a rival supermarket chain did not 
render it ‘unsuitable’. As ODPM (2004) stated: “PPG6… (was) increasingly used by 
LPAs as a development control tool to prevent out-of-centre development, instead of 
as a basis for positive planning for town centres. It became all but impossible to 
develop large-format out-of-town stores in England.” 
  
                                                 
2
 Total car miles increased by 39 percent from 1970 to 1980; by 56 percent during the 1980s; 12 
percent during the 1990s and a further 7 percent from 2000 to 2008 (Department for Transport, 2012). 
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Wales: 
Policy followed changes in England closely except that guidance gave more emphasis 
to the aim of a competitive retail sector and enforcement at the local level appears to 
have been rather more flexible. 
Scotland: 
1996 – A form of Town Centre First policy, significantly weaker than that in England, 
was introduced. There was an explicit aim of maintaining a ‘competitive and 
innovative retail sector’ and a statement that it was not the role of planning to ‘protect 
existing interests or restrain competition’ but did steer local planners to favour town 
centre locations for new retail by introducing a form of the ‘sequential’ test. 
1998 – A revised policy gave more emphasis to directing retail development to Town 
Centres and added leisure uses to those where the preferred location for development 
was in Town Centres in the name of ‘sustainability’ and access via public transport; 
but the guidance continued to instruct planners to assist in maintaining ‘an efficient, 
competitive and innovative retail sector offering consumer choice’; the ‘sequential’ 
test was maintained but the ‘needs’ test was not introduced. 
2006 – Policy became slightly more restrictive towards the development of out-of-
town retail while remaining significantly more flexible than that in England. There 
was no ‘needs’ test introduced and out-of-town development was permitted when 
there was access by public transport. 
Northern Ireland: 
1996 - A form of Town Centre First policy was introduced. This remained more 
flexible than in England. Critically, however, policy distinguished between 
comparison shopping and food: “Food superstores, however, rely on the close 
proximity of adequate car parking and for this reason locations within existing town 
centres may be inappropriate. Edge-of-centre sites may provide a preferred alternative 
in many towns ...” (Competition Commission, 2000). There was emphasis given to 
new developments not leading to a significant loss of investment in existing centres 
and accessibility by transport other than cars but the policy, especially for 
supermarkets, was much less restrictive even than in Scotland. 
 
As can be seen from the outline above, policy towards out-of-town supermarket and 
retail development in England gradually tightened from 1988 with the radical change 
in policy coming in 1996. This strongly redirected retail (and other traditional town 
8
  
 
centre uses) to town centres (as defined by planners). Far from attempting to avoid 
‘unnecessary regulation’ as previous policies had done, it put the emphasis firmly on 
‘town centre first’. According to ODPM (2004, page 21) the underlying rationale for 
the change in policy was that town centre sites were the most ‘sustainable’: “…on the 
premise that town centres are the most accessible locations for alternative [that is non-
car] means of transport and facilitate ‘linked trips’ thereby reducing the need to 
travel.”  
 
As Figure I shows the policy change in England sharply affected the volume of 
applications for major new retail developments. These had more than doubled from 
the bottom of the economic cycle in 1983 to its peak in 1988 and by 1992 had begun 
to recover from the 1990 recession. Following the introduction of the full blown TCF 
policies in 1996, however, development applications fell sharply despite the 
continuing economic recovery, so that even by 2002 the volume of applications was 
little greater than in 1983. Since the revised PPG6 of 1996 applied only to new 
developments, however, applications for store extensions boomed. The Competition 
Commission (2000) reports – based on its sample of LPAs – that in 1997 and 1998 
there was nearly a fivefold increase in applications for foodstore extensions compared 
to the preceding five year period. The sample of LPAs surveyed in ODPM (2004) 
shows an increase from zero extension-applications per LPA in 1994 to 10 in 1998. 
There must, therefore, be a presumption this favoured incumbents by restricting entry. 
At the same time the strategic policy of major store groups was revised. Tesco and 
Sainsbury in particular developed smaller, in town, formats: in 1994 some 25 percent 
of Tesco’s new openings were in town but by 2000 all new openings were defined as 
‘in town’; Sainsbury went from some 12 percent ‘in town’ in 1995 to 85 percent in  
1999.  
Figure I about here 
A further point is that the sharp reduction in store development – illustrated in Figure 
I – has come to be reflected in an older stock of buildings in the retail sector than in 
any other economic sector. As Barker (2006) shows, an astonishing 90 percent of 
retail space dates from 1980 or before: this compares to some 75 percent of office 
space or 70 percent of warehouse space. Older buildings tend to be less productive 
and also less energy efficient. 
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A further impact has been to raise the price of retail space everywhere but particularly 
in out-of-town locations (see Cheshire, Hilber and Kaplanis, 2011). The supermarket 
chain for which we have data classifies its stores’ locations according to official types 
as designated by the planning system. It turns out that in fact stores, which are 
officially classified by the planning system as in  ‘Town Centres’, have the cheapest 
space, followed by those in officially classified ‘District Centres’. Indeed the evidence 
shows that retail space costs in the UK are only slightly related to various measures 
capturing the distance to functionally measured city centres; they actually increase at 
the extreme urban periphery. This suggests that space was most restricted in out-of-
town locations where stores were likely most productive, so space costs actually rose 
with distance from actual town centres.  
 
III. HYPOTHESES AND APPROACH TO TESTING 
The hypotheses we are interested in testing are as follows. The first is to confirm the 
findings of the Competition Commission (2008) that all else held constant, larger 
stores are associated with higher sales and productivity. We wish to do this, however, 
in a way which allows us to test our second hypothesis: that the operation of the 
planning system has a causal role in reducing store sizes. Our third hypothesis is that 
the planning system – especially TCF policies – reduces TFP directly. In so far as the 
evidence supports these hypotheses, we can use our estimates to quantify the 
reduction in total output in the supermarket sector – or more accurately in the major 
supermarket group for which we have data – generated by planning policies.  
 
There are three routes by which planning policies might reduce productivity in 
retailing. Policies may both directly restrict store size or format and site 
characteristics via TCF policies3; secondly the various policies may favour 
incumbents and generate a barrier to entry as analysed by Bertrand and Kramarz 
(2002) for France or Schivardi and Viviano (2011) for Italy although in the cases 
which they analyse, regulation is directly on entry rather than via land use planning 
policies; thirdly the restriction on space for retail may increase the price of such space 
                                                 
3
 As an illustration someone who was a planner working for a major supermarket group in the 1970s 
informs us in a private communication that in that era they would easily be able to persuade LPAs to 
allow a proposed store to be moved closer to a roundabout on a major road which could improve sales 
substantially. This became very difficult or impossible after about 1990. 
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and so cause it to be substituted out of production, further reducing productivity in the 
sector. The first two routes would reduce total factor productivity while the third 
would reduce labour productivity. In practice these three routes reduce to two since 
we cannot differentiate between the first two: the impact of TCF policies on forcing 
stores to less productive locations or smaller sites and their impact on restricting 
entry.4 So in summary: 
1. TCF policies may impede entry and force stores (by the sequential test, for 
example, or just by forcing location to be in town centres or on particular sites 
within town centres) to be on smaller and/or less productive sites than they 
would otherwise have selected. As discussed in Section V this effect would 
work mainly via reduced consumer welfare, reducing store sales, other things 
equal. 
2. Separately, containment policies, by increasing the price of space in general, 
will tend to reduce store sizes. Retailers may still successfully choose profit 
maximising store sizes but the higher cost of space causes it to be substituted 
out of production. This increases costs and leads to lower output and 
efficiency losses compared to the space use that would have been employed 
had the price of space not been increased by the constraint on land supply. 
 
To test these hypotheses we use detailed store level data with exact store location so 
other geographic/spatial data, which is relevant and may influence store sales and 
productivity, can be included in the analysis. Furthermore we need store location 
because of the fact that the characteristics of the location with respect to the centre of 
urban areas may plausibly be causally linked to store productivity and the planning 
system is operated at the level of Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) and (despite a 
national policy) may vary in its restrictiveness from LPA to LPA.  
 
IV. DATA 
We use two novel datasets. The first consists of individual store-level information on 
a full set of stores from a major UK supermarket group who has given us access to 
                                                 
4
 Any such restriction on entry, by increasing local market power of individual stores, would be likely 
to increase product prices and so might increase our observed measure of output. To the extent that this 
was the case, we would underestimate the true economic cost of land use regulation. This links to the 
issue raised in the literature about the difficulty of measuring retail productivity (Griffith and Harmgart, 
2005; Reynolds et al., 2005). However, in so far as planning induced constraints directly reduce store 
sizes and force stores onto sub-optimal sites this will unambiguously reduce sales. 
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their data but wishes to remain anonymous. Variables include sales, both net and 
gross floorspace (the difference between them being storage space), whether a store 
has a mezzanine floor and employment by store. Furthermore, store characteristics 
like total opening hours and store format have been obtained. The store location is 
available at full postcode level from which grid references have been obtained. 
 
Some key summary statistics are shown in Table I. In total there are 357 stores in the 
UK with all or most variables reported for 2008. Out of the total of 357 stores, 336 are 
food-formats and 21 are non-food formats. Since non-food formats are quite different 
to food-format stores, they are considered as a special case and are either excluded 
from the analysis or a dummy is added. From the food-format stores, there are 55 
defined by the company as ‘small stores’, 252 as ‘superstores’ and 29 as 
‘supercentres’. The small type stores have a mean floorspace of 25,000 sq. ft., the 
superstores 49,000 sq. ft. and the supercentres 85,000 sq. ft. Overall, net floorspace 
varies from a low of just over 8,000 sq. ft. to a high of more than 100,000 sq. ft. Our 
measure of employment varies from 32 to 471. The main capital employed in the 
supermarket sector beyond the premises themselves is stock. We do not have data on 
this but do have a measure of storage space which we take to be a proxy for stock. 
This is therefore our capital measure. 
 
The vast majority – 95 percent - of employees are paid on an hourly basis with the 
rest on a salaried basis. This information has been used to construct a full-time 
equivalent of employment since the hourly contracted staff worked part-time while 
the salaried staff were full-time. Staff remuneration and individual hours were not 
available in detail from the company but based on their information we make the 
simple assumption that salaried employees are full time and hourly workers are on 
average half time. This allows us to estimate Full Time Equivalent (FTE) labour 
inputs at the store level. See Section V for further rationale for this assumption. 
Table I about here 
The second dataset we use relates to planning decisions. We collected all data on 
planning outcomes from the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). These are for Local Planning Authorities (LPA) and cover all LPAs in 
England and thus correspond to a subset of 269 stores. The variable used in our 
analysis to capture the restrictiveness of planning regulation at the LPA level is the 
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refusal rate for major residential projects. This variable corresponds to the ratio of 
rejected to total planning applications for major residential projects (projects 
consisting of 10 or more dwellings). These planning data run from 1979 to 2008. We 
use the data for major residential projects rather than major retail projects because 
there are insufficient applications for major retail developments to yield statistically 
reliable indicators of regulatory restrictiveness. 
 
Others have used planning variables in their analyses of the economic impact of the 
planning system (see, for example, Cheshire and Sheppard, 1989; Preston, Ridge and 
Wood, 1996 or Hilber and Vermeulen, 2010). The most obvious variable to use is the 
refusal rate although it might be expected that more restrictive LPAs would also have 
more delayed decisions so that the delay and refusal rates would be positively 
correlated. Given the cyclicality of application rates for development one might think 
of the mean refusal rate for a longer time period as the best indicator for the individual 
LPA.  
 
It is well known, however, that there is a potential endogeneity problem with the 
refusal rate measure since the behaviour of developers may be influenced by the 
behaviour of LPAs. Since applications cost significant resources, would-be 
developers may hold back from making applications in LPAs known to be restrictive, 
so no refusal results. Indeed there may be prior negotiations before any application is 
made and when it is clear an application will not be likely to be successful it may not 
come forward. There is, however, a counterforce of restrictiveness. Although the 
probability of success may be lower in LPAs known to be more restrictive, thus 
discouraging would-be developers from applying, the payoff from successful 
applications will be higher because permissions are scarcer. This will tend to increase 
the flow of applications and – given that the LPA is restrictive – the refusal rate. 
Although we do not know a priori which of these two incentives will be stronger, we 
suspect the ‘discouraged developer effect’ should prevail. Consistent with this 
conjecture, the analysis of store locations reported in Table IV reveals that greater 
LPA-level regulatory restrictiveness, other things held equal, significantly reduces the 
probability of there being a store at all. 
 
This possible endogeneity of the refusal rate measure makes identification of causality 
problematic. Our approach to this problem is to devise an instrument. Specifically, we 
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exploit exogenous variation in regulatory restrictiveness arising from local differences 
in political control. A comparable identification strategy was first used by Bertrand 
and Kramarz (2002) and later, in a more comparable context, by Sadun (2008). We 
discuss this in more detail in Section V. 
 
V. RESULTS 
Underlying the analysis in this section is the estimation of a production function for 
supermarkets with land as an explicit factor of production. A Cobb-Douglas 
functional form is applied with factors of production floorspace, labour and capital. 
We have only one year’s data available so cannot use a panel approach and the natural 
log of sales (turnover) is used as the dependent variable. The supermarket chain 
whose data we have access to, however, has a rigid policy of uniform mark-ups by 
product across all stores, so sales per store should be closely correlated with gross 
margins and value added.5  
 
The production function is as follows: 
  = 

	

  (1) 
where: 
Yi: sales of store i 
A: total factor productivity (TFP) 
Fi: floorspace of store i; Li: labour input of store i; Ki: capital input of store i 
 
Our basic econometric specification can be written as: 
  =  +  ln  +  ln  +  ln
 + 
 + 
 +  (2) 
where: 
X’i: vector of store specific controls (such as age of store and age of store squared) 
Z’j: vector of area specific controls 
 
We would interpret positive coefficients 	and  on the store- and location-specific 
variables and upward shifts in β0 as signifying an increase in TFP6 while a change in 
                                                 
5
 The store group does vary the product mix by store so, for example, the largest pack sizes or not pre-
packed fruit and vegetables may not be available in smaller stores: also they claim to match fuel prices 
with the lowest-priced local outlet so petrol and diesel prices vary. 
6
 That is, we allow TFP to vary by store i and location j. TFP can be expressed as  =  !"#$ %&#'. 
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the quantity of, say, floorspace  would be associated with a change in capital and/or 
labour productivity. 
 
There are two apparent limitations to our data. One is that our measure of capital is 
less than ideal; another is that our data is cross-sectional in that sales and inputs relate 
to only one year. The data has, however, three very substantial advantages for our 
research: it covers all establishments but of only one firm; it is at the level of the 
individual store; and it includes the date each store was established, adding a time-
dimension to our otherwise cross-sectional dataset.  
 
The desirability of single firm data is stressed by Javorcik (2004). She discusses some 
of the significant econometric problems identified in the literature when the store 
level data comes from numerous firms. Griliches and Mairesse (1995) argue that the 
choice of inputs may be potentially endogenous since they are selected by the 
producer who has specific knowledge about the productivity of say labour for that 
firm (compared to others) or in that particular market. This supports using single firm 
and establishment level data since the retail outlets of a large chain will be in many 
local markets. Griffith and Harmgart (2005) similarly argue for store level data. They 
also point out the need to include store age given the findings of Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Krizan (2002) that in the US productivity growth in retailing largely occurs in 
new stores (a nice irony for us since we find that in England new stores since about 
1990 have been increasingly less productive). Our data relates to all establishments of 
one firm so inter-firm variation in productivity known to managers but not to 
economists is not relevant and we can include local market controls.7 Moreover, the 
firm in question has a standardised national policy governing employment policies 
and its pricing, with equal prices across all stores.  
 
The main results on which we rely to identify the impact of Town Centre First 
policies on productivity are those of the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) model. 
Following equation (2), our DiD-estimating equation can be expressed as: 
  
  
                                                 
7
 In our empirical analysis we include fixed effects for local labour markets, identified as Travel to 
Work Areas (TTWAs). These covariates should effectively control for differences in labour 
productivity or availability across local labour markets.  
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This specification exploits the variation in the implementation of TCF policies in 
England compared to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Since policies in Wales are only 
somewhat differentiated from those in England, we exclude the few Welsh stores.8 
The results are reported in Table II. In Appendix Table A.1 we report the results of 
estimating our base specification (2), separately for English stores and the combined 
Scotland and Northern Ireland stores. 
 
One problem for both these approaches is that we do not have exact information on 
labour hours per store, only a head count of salaried staff who we assume are full-
time, and hourly paid staff who we assume are half time for reasons explained in 
Section IV. So we construct an estimate of full-time equivalent employment (FTE) by 
multiplying the headcount of hourly-paid staff by 0.5 and salaried staff by 1. We also 
experimented with other ways of estimating FTEs (for example simply aggregating up 
all employees or using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings9) and concluded that 
the estimate of FTE employment is not particularly sensitive to this assumption. 
Using a multiplier of 0.5, however, yields – by a small margin - the best estimates in 
that the coefficient on FTE employment is most precisely estimated.  
 
The measure of floorspace used is net floorspace. This is more sensible theoretically. 
Moreover as noted we are able to estimate storage space as the difference between 
gross and net floorspace.  The DiD model reported in Table II includes some 
appropriate controls. The first control is the presence of a mezzanine floor; it is 
widely believed in the retail trade that mezzanine floors tend to generate less sales per 
unit area than the ground floor does. The sign on this variable is always negative 
albeit only significant in the ‘conventional’ production function results reported in 
Table A.1 but not in the DiD model. Further relevant controls are labour inputs 
measured as employment in FTEs (employment), total opening hours (hours) and a 
                                                 
8
 However, results are qualitatively similar across all reported specifications if we include the Welsh 
stores with England. 
9
 We used the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings data at the LPA level on hours worked for the 
specific occupational categories covering retail workers but concluded that the company’s own  data 
although somewhat approximate were more accurate than making implicit assumptions that workers in 
a given occupation and LPA worked similar hours regardless of which retailer/store employed them. 
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dummy variable for non-food format stores (non-food format). The latter dummy is 
included because non-food stores differ from food format stores in various ways (e.g. 
their logistics) that may affect the relevant characteristics of their specific production 
function; the dummy captures unobserved characteristics that are unique to the store 
type. We also control for the impact of more local competition (competition).  This 
measures the proximity of the store in question to the nearest five stores in the two 
main chains with which our store group competes most closely. Although the 
coefficient on this control has the expected sign, it is only significant in the full 
production function approach reported in Table A.1 not in the DiD models reported in 
Table II. 
Table II about here 
We also add two alternative sets of control variables to capture unobserved 
characteristics that relate to the age of the store. The first is in effect a continuous time 
trend. We experimented exhaustively with functional forms but found a simple 
quadratic fitted the data best. All higher order polynomial forms were statistically 
completely insignificant. The second set of controls is one dummy variable for each 
year of store opening, capturing non-linear effects that relate to store age. We also 
control for a key characteristic of store catchment areas – their ‘market potential’ 
measured as population within a 10 minute drive-time. In other models - reported in 
the unpublished Web Appendix Tables U.1 to U.4 – we have included additional area 
controls including local car ownership measured as the share of households with cars 
within 15 minute drive time; and local income measured as average full time male 
earnings. These controls were insignificant in most models. Crucially, they have no 
impact on the key results of interest here so are omitted in the main models reported 
in Tables II to IV. All models reported in Table II also include Travel to Work Area 
fixed effects as do models (2) and (4) in Table A.1. The argument for including area 
fixed effects is that there may be unobserved (time-invariant) variables specific to 
certain areas. We use Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) to capture these possible area 
effects on the grounds that TTWAs are defined to be economically self-contained in 
the sense that people who live within a given TTWA tend also to work in the same 
area; and so it may be supposed, tend to shop within that area too.  
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As expected, results indicate a significant and positive effect of both space and 
employment on output measured as sales. Larger stores, all else held constant, have 
stronger sales. The key result is the DiD-effect however. As described in Section III 
restrictions on out-of-town supermarkets began to be introduced in England from 
1988 but were implemented with almost complete rigidity when Town Centre First 
policy was introduced in 1996. Policy attempts to steer retail to traditional town 
centres were introduced rather later and never as rigidly in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. We therefore report results for two break points, 1988 and 1996, although we 
have experimented with intervening years and get broadly similar results. We observe 
that regardless of the break year selected English stores became significantly less 
productive - all else equal - to those in Scotland and Northern Ireland by about the 
same amount. The coefficients on the DiD variable are always statistically significant 
and point estimates of our preferred specifications reported in columns (3) and (6) of 
Table II are -0.097 and -0.095, respectively, implying a loss in TFP of about 9.6 
percent. We note that this is an underestimate of TFP loss – not just a lower bound – 
to the extent that TCF policies in Scotland and Northern Ireland were also binding. 
 
Table A.1 reports essentially similar results but does not use a DiD approach. The 
causal inference is therefore weaker (although one might argue it is necessary to find 
only one smoking gun to demonstrate causation). Instead we estimate models 
separately for the English stores and those in Scotland and Northern Ireland exploiting 
the fact that we know the year of opening of the store (and, therefore, whether the 
store’s location and size likely were affected by TCF policies in the respective UK 
countries). For most of the key variables results are broadly similar with space and 
employment continuing always to be statistically significant. The point of particular 
interest is the effect of the year of opening or age of store variable and the squared 
term of this variable.  
 
As noted in Section II we are observing something like a natural experiment. By 
comparing the results from the models estimated on the English stores (models 
reported in columns 1 and 2) with those estimated on stores in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (columns 3 and 4) in Table A.1, it becomes apparent that the effect of age of 
store on productivity is highly significant in England but not at all significant in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
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For the sample of English stores the relationship between age of store and output is 
clearly quadratic (similar to the effects reported in columns (2) and (5) of Table II).10 
The estimated best fit relationship for date of founding and output (based on Table 
A.1, column 2) implies that the oldest stores have – as would be expected – a lower 
output other things equal. Output, all else held constant, increases for stores founded 
during the 1960s and 1970s but only until around 1986. Output in stores founded after 
1986 flattens and then begins to fall and the very newest stores have the lowest output 
of all. There is of course some error associated with estimating the peak store age for 
output (or productivity) but its growth closely reflects the period of innovation with 
larger format, out-of-town stores during the 1970s and 1980s and the peak and 
subsequent decline is entirely consistent with the DiD results reported in Table II 
strongly suggesting that one impact of the changes in planning policies in England has 
been to make stores less productive for any given size. An obvious interpretation is 
that this results from policy forcing retail to intrinsically less productive locations and 
sites and so reflects a policy imposed reduction in TFP in the supermarket sector.  
 
However the estimated relationship between date of store foundation and output does 
not account for all of the observed reduction in store output observed from the early 
1990s because the TCF policies in England additionally significantly reduced the 
average store size. This is illustrated in Figure II which shows the average size of 
stores founded in each year from 1966. What we observe is that there were apparently 
two separate effects causing store productivity and output to fall as a result of the 
change in planning policies in England. The first was to regulate the micro-location of 
stores pushing them to town centres. This was associated with a loss of TFP because 
of less convenience for customer access and for logistics. Town centre sites are 
intrinsically less productive. This effect is captured in the quadratic relationship 
between store age and output all else – including store size - held equal. However all 
else was not held equal as evidenced by Figure II. The policies not only pushed stores 
towards less productive town centre locations but they also controlled the particular 
sites stores could locate on and these were – being in town centres – on average 
smaller. So falling store size as a result of the micromanagement of store locations 
                                                 
10
 As in columns (2) and (5) of Table II, we exhaustively experimented with alternative functional 
forms but the quadratic form fitted the data best and higher order polynomials were statistically 
insignificant.  
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provided an additional reduction to the output we observe. This fall in output due to 
smaller store size can be interpreted as a fall in labour productivity since the effect is 
that of less output per unit of labour input. Summing up, micro-location as well as 
store size both matter, and matter significantly and, in the present case of enforced 
locations, adversely for store output and productivity. 
Figure II about here  
At this point we should perhaps discuss in more depth the origins of the productivity 
penalty induced by TCF policies. What the data are telling us is that controlling for all 
other factors, including store size, sales per store fell systematically for stores founded 
after TCF policies began to seriously bite in England; and that store size itself matters 
for sales per store all else equal. This evidence from the DiD models in Table II is 
perhaps econometrically most persuasive on these points although since we are not 
comparing a ‘treated’ with an ‘untreated’ case but rather a strongly treated (England) 
and a modestly and later treated case (Scotland and Northern Ireland) the estimated 
DiD coefficients will almost certainly underestimate the actual size of the impact on 
TFP of TCF policies. These productivity effects, however, must largely come through 
the consumer welfare side since we do not directly measure costs: only output 
measured by sales. The hypothesis is that stores were constrained to less productive 
sites but the impact on logistic costs for the company is not completely captured in 
our data. What appears to be completely captured is the impact on customer 
experiences and satisfaction. In-town stores are more difficult to get to, require more 
carrying of purchases and are likely to be more subject to stock control problems 
(storage facilities are smaller and delivery systems less efficient; see Bell and Hilber, 
2006). Because they are smaller, the range of goods, especially pack sizes, may be 
less attractive for customers. Equally out-of-town stores, easy to reach by car (and 
lorry), allow quicker and less stressful shopping and a greater chance of finding items 
the customer needs because storage, stocking and delivery systems are more efficient. 
So any additional costs imposed on the store group by the micromanagement of site 
selection imposed by TCF policies would be partially (e.g. with delivery-associated 
costs) reflected in our data but not fully measured.11 
 
                                                 
11
 Additional store specific costs would likely be negatively capitalized into land prices, consistent with 
our observation that land prices are lowest for city centre stores. 
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The interpretation of the relationship between year of store foundation and TFP is 
made more plausible still by another piece of evidence. The most obvious alternative 
explanation for why older stores are more productive could be that as the store group 
expanded and built more stores over time, it chose the most productive and attractive-
to-customer locations first. However the evidence does not support this explanation. 
The most obvious measure of an attractive location is the population within a 10 
minute drive time. The correlation between the age of the store and population within 
a 10 minute drive time for English stores is wholly non-significant (r= -0.019, 
p=0.76). That for stores in the rest of the UK is (r=0.260, p=0.014). In other words 
there is no significant relationship at all between the measure of location 
attractiveness and store age in England. In the less constrained rest of the UK there is 
some positive relationship although this is not significant at conventional levels. So, 
although in the less constrained rest of the UK there is some tendency for the older 
stores to be in locations with higher market potential, since this is included as an 
independent variable in Table II, its impact is controlled for even in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland in the estimation of the store productivity - store age relationship. 
The role of planning restrictiveness 
We have persuasive evidence, therefore, that the tightening up on out-of-town stores 
in England which started in 1988, and the micromanagement of store locations 
imposed with the full-blooded TCF policies introduced in 1996, caused a significant 
decline of store-level productivity. Another issue is whether cross sectional variation 
in the restrictiveness of the planning system also influences store productivity. The 
most obvious way in which to investigate this is to see whether there is a direct 
relationship between indicators of planning restrictiveness at the LPA level and store 
size: does more restrictive local planning policy make stores smaller, all else equal? 
By constraining the supply of space, planning policies increase its price, thereby 
causing a substitution of space out of production. The more restrictively policies are 
applied by an LPA, the smaller might stores tend to be. While also having the effect 
of reducing productivity, this would be an ‘efficient’, cost minimising adaptation by 
stores to distorted factor prices12. Another possible outcome of more restrictively 
                                                 
12
 The circumstantial evidence is that the generalised ‘containment’ policies implemented in Britain 
since the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act were having the effect of constraining land supply and 
increasing its price well before our measure of local planning restrictiveness starts in 1979. Such 
effects were discussed in Hall et al. (1973) and documented for 1984 in Cheshire and Sheppard (1986). 
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applied policies might be of course that there is no store at all. The results of testing 
these two possibilities are investigated in Tables III and IV. 
Table III about here 
Table III shows the results of relating store size to the restrictiveness with which 
planning policy is locally applied using the data for food format stores only.13 We 
have planning outcomes for every LPA in England from 1979 to 2008. Since we do 
not have this information for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland we have to drop 
stores in those countries from the analysis. We also drop those stores opened before 
the date our measures of local planning restrictiveness could have had any effect. We 
take this to be 1980 – so our sample is restricted to English stores founded after 1980.  
These two restrictions reduce the number of observations from 357 to 217. As is 
argued in Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) there are good reasons for taking the long 
term mean of measures of planning restrictiveness to eliminate one source of 
endogeneity, their fluctuation with the economic cycle. We therefore take the average 
refusal rate of major residential projects in an LPA for the period 1979-2008 as our 
measure of LPA restrictiveness (see Section IV for the rationale of taking the refusal 
rate of major residential projects).  
 
Because of endogeneity concerns with respect to the use of the refusal rate we use an 
IV approach. Our identification strategy follows that adopted by Bertrand and 
Kramarz (2002)14 and implemented by Sadun (2008) who used the same planning 
data and methodology as ours in a similar context. Table III shows the results using 
the share of Labour councillors at the local elections over the period 2000-2008 as 
an instrument for the refusal rate of major applications for residential projects. The 
logic for using political composition as an instrument is (see Sadun; 2008, or Hilber 
and Vermeulen 2010)  that low and middle income Labour voters traditionally care 
                                                                                                                                            
The point is that while land prices may have been generally raised even by 1979 still cross sectional 
variation in planning restrictiveness since then would be related to systematic variation in retail space 
prices between LPAs. 
13
 As noted above space constraints are likely to have a differential effect for food and non-food format 
stores. A dummy variable for non-food format stores would not (fully) capture these differential 
effects. We note however that results are qualitatively similar if we estimate specifications for the full 
sample of English stores and control for the store type by including a dummy variable, although the 
effects are slightly less precisely estimated.  
14
 Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) used the voting proportions for right wing parties as an instrument for 
how restrictive a French department would likely be towards new retail entrants. They found a 
significant positive relationship. Here we are using what is in effect a mirror image instrument – the 
proportion of representation from the main left wing party. 
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more about the availability of jobs, prices in shops and housing affordability and less 
about the protection of house values (fewer low income residents own homes) by 
preventing development.15 It may also be the case that concern for protecting green 
fields from development is a normal good. Higher income voters might be more 
concerned with preventing development on green field sites than are lower income 
ones. Hence, we would expect the local share of votes for the Labour party to be 
negatively associated with the restrictiveness of the local planning system. Our 
identifying assumption is that, controlling for the other covariates (i.e. the other 
explanatory variables of store size16), the share of Labour seats affects retail store size 
only through planning restrictiveness. The first stage results reported in the bottom 
panel of Table III confirm that the share of Labour seats is strongly and statistically 
highly significantly negatively correlated with regulatory restrictiveness. The values 
of the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic show that weak identification is not a problem. 
 
The top panel of Table III reports the results of the estimated effect of planning 
restrictiveness on store size. The model results reported in column (1) are estimated 
using OLS and without TTWA fixed effects or controls. This naïve estimate implies a 
negative and significant effect of the regulatory restrictiveness on store size. 
However, this estimate is likely biased.  The results based on our IV approach are 
reported in columns (2) to (4). The results reported in column (2) are based on the 
same model as in column (1) but are now estimated with TSLS, taking into account 
the likely endogeneity of the refusal rate. The model in column (3) includes both 
controls for exogenous influences on store size and also TTWA fixed effects. Finally, 
the model in column (4) additionally controls for the number of years since the store 
opened. The rationale for including this additional control variable is that we will 
capture the relationship between store age and size due to TCF policies. The 
                                                 
15
 Homeowners have strong incentives to behave as NIMBYs (Not-In-My-Backyard) and oppose new 
residential construction nearby as more local housing supply or impeded views adversely affect house 
prices. While renters may also like nice views, they are likely to be at least partially compensated for 
deteriorating views by being able to negotiate lower rents.  
16
 One might be concerned that Labour voters differ from other voters with respect to their earnings 
and their probability of owning a car and that the two measures might be correlated with the refusal 
rate and, at the same time, directly related (e.g. through sorting of households with similar 
characteristics) to store size and the probability that there is a store of the supermarket chain in a 
particular LPA. To address this concern we estimated models with earnings and car ownership in the 
first and second stage of our TSLS-estimates. The earnings and car ownership controls were typically 
insignificant and did not alter our results; so we dropped them from our final specifications. However, 
results with the two controls are available in the Unpublished Web Appendix Tables U.2 and U.3. 
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coefficient on the refusal rate measure is negative and significant in all three IV-
estimates. It is noticeably larger in the IV-estimates implying a downward bias 
introduced by the endogeneity of the refusal rate. The last model arguably provides 
the stiffest test. Model (4) would seem, therefore, to provide the best consistent 
estimate of the impact of cross sectional variation in LPA restrictiveness and to 
confirm that planning restrictiveness has a direct casual influence on store size and so 
on productivity in the supermarket sector. It thus provides evidence indicative of a 
causal relationship from more restrictive local planning policies to smaller store sizes.  
 
However more restrictive local authorities may not just tend to make stores smaller; 
they may exclude them altogether. This is tested in Table IV. Again using the same 
IV approach we test two ideas. The first, with results reported in columns (1) and (2) 
– using OLS and TSLS (based on the same IV-strategy) – of Table IV, is that greater 
restrictiveness reduces the probability of their being a store at all; the second, with 
results reported in columns (3) and (4), is that greater restrictiveness reduces the 
number of stores. The results point very strongly to the conclusion that there is a 
direct causal effect from more restrictive policies to there simply not being a 
supermarket or their being fewer supermarkets. This is not exactly measuring an 
impact of planning restrictiveness on store productivity although it does strongly 
suggest a loss of consumer welfare caused by a more restrictive local application of 
planning policies. 
Table IV about here 
Estimated impact on productivity 
These quantitative estimates of the impact of TCF policies on total factor productivity 
in supermarkets (Table II), on the relationship between the age of a store and the 
store’s normalised productivity (Table A.1) and that between LPA restrictiveness and 
store size can be converted into direct estimates of the overall impact of planning 
policies on output and productivity in the supermarket sector. To these we need to add 
a measure of the productivity impact of the direct reduction in store sizes following 
the introduction of TCF policies as illustrated in Figure II. The results of this exercise 
are shown in Table V. 
 
The quantitative effects shown in panel [1] of Table V use the DiD results reported in 
Table II to estimate an average loss of TFP in English stores from TCF policies, store 
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size held constant. For reasons noted above – that even in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, there were policies designed to steer retailing to town centres, albeit less rigid 
and introduced later – the estimated loss of TFP of 9.6 percent is not just a very 
conservative lower bound but almost certainly an underestimate of the impact in 
absolute terms. Panel [2] of Table V provides an alternative estimate of the impact on 
TFP of TCF policy in England again holding store size constant. It uses the 
relationship between age of a store and normalised productivity reported in Table A.1 
to simulate what productivity for an average store in 2006 (chosen as the date of 
opening by which it could reasonably be assumed that the store would have reached 
full operating efficiency by 2008) would have been, if the rate of productivity had 
continued to grow between 1986 and 2006 at the rate observed in our data for the 
period 1966 to 1986 (0.46% per annum). This provides a counterfactual productivity 
estimate for 2006 stores. The implied loss of TFP of a representative 2006 English 
store on this basis is 16.2 percent. Panel [3] quantifies the impact on productivity of 
the smaller size TCF policies imposed on stores (see the discussion of Figure II). The 
main driver of increasing store size was the continuing increase in car ownership and 
the use of more and larger lorries in logistics coupled with the completion of the 
motorway network. This in turn interacted with population decentralisation, itself 
influenced by the same factors (Anas and Moses 1978; Cheshire, 1995). The problem 
is that choosing the counterfactual is not straightforward. We have to assume some 
size the average store would have been in 2008 in the absence of TCF policies. We 
have chosen it to be as conservative as possible and assumed simply that if stores had 
continued to locate without the specific constraint on site size imposed by TCF policy 
then new stores founded after 1996 would have been as large but no larger than new 
stores founded between 1990 and 1995 were on average. This would, of course, only 
impact on the output of stores founded after 1996. The implications of this assumption 
for the additional loss in store sales imposed by TCF policy is shown in panel [3] of 
Table V. It represents a further loss of productivity – which we attribute to labour 
productivity – of 2.6 percent. 
Table V about here  
There are two reasons why even these values may be a conservative or lower bound 
estimate of the productivity losses imposed by TCF policies. Apart from the 
likelihood that as car ownership continued to rise after 1995, stores would have 
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continued to get bigger (which we discount), as Haskel and Sadun (2009) report, 
productivity in the British retail sector actually grew in the first 5 years of the 1990s at 
a rate of 0.38% pa. This, however, compares with an annualised rate of productivity 
growth in the US of 0.49% and, in the US, this productivity growth accelerated 
sharply in the second half of the 1990s to 3.23% per annum (Haskel and Sadun, 
2009). Given this evidence from the US, to assume even a constant rate of 
productivity growth in British retailing over the whole period 1966 to 2006 is likely to 
be a low rather than high estimate. The second factor is that we are only to a limited 
extent including additional costs imposed on the firm. These are likely to include 
more expensive logistics given that stores were increasingly located in more 
congested areas in town centres, farther from motorway access, and were smaller, 
with less storage space, so requiring more frequent re-stocking. 
 
Thus the DiD based estimate of the hit to TFP of TCF policies (Panel [1]) is almost 
certainly an underestimate although it does provide a much more secure basis of 
identification than the loss of 16.2 percent (Panel [2]) derived from the straight 
comparison of results for English versus Scottish and Northern Irish stores reported in 
Table A.1. The assumptions underlying the further loss from directly forcing stores to 
be smaller (Panel [3]) is just based on a conservative assumption about how big stores 
would have been by 2008 without the constraint of being forced onto particular sites 
in town centres. 
 
There is however still another source of lost productivity associated with planning 
polices more generally. We should include an estimate of the impact of reduced store 
sizes in the more restrictive LPAs compared to the least restrictive. An estimate of 
this is shown in panel [4] of Table V. To derive this, our baseline is the average 
predicted productivity assuming that all stores in the sample were located in LPAs 
with the same regulatory restrictiveness as observed in the least restrictive LPA.17 We 
                                                 
17
 It might be objected that the least restrictive LPA might not be realistically representative of the level 
of restrictiveness that could apply in the real world because either it is an outlier or it might represent 
some form of measurement error. However our measure of restrictiveness is the average of all values 
for each year from 1979 to 2008 so simple measurement error could have little if any impact; and even 
by 1979 policies constraining the supply of land for retail use had been in place in all English LPAs at 
least since the mid-1950s. Given the rise in car ownership and incomes between then and 1979 it is all 
but inconceivable that even in the least restrictive LPA (Middlesbrough) there was not an economically 
effective constraint on land supply. This conclusion is supported by the estimated price of land for 
retail development compared to that for industrial use in Darlington (another less prosperous city of the 
NE of England chosen because it had some of the least constraining land use policies observed in 
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compare this counterfactual productivity (which is comparably higher as the 
counterfactual stores are bigger) to the predicted productivity based on the actually 
observed regulatory restrictiveness in each LPA. This comparison implies a loss of 
TFP of 6.1 percent for the store group overall. Given the implausibility of even the 
least restrictive LPA having had no impact on the price of retail land (for example see 
Appendix 12.7 of Competition Commission, 2000), again, this value seems likely to 
be a lower bound estimate. We should emphasise that we still include no allowance 
for the results reported in Table IV: that it is simply less likely that there will be any 
store in the more restrictive LPAs. 
 
The final panels of Table V summarise these results. On the most conservative of 
assumptions TCF policies appear to have caused a loss of at least 12.2 percent in 
supermarket productivity. This is almost certainly however not a conservative lower 
bound but an underestimate since it assumes that there was no effect on store 
productivity in Scotland or Northern Ireland of policies there designed to steer retail 
development to town centres. The final figure for the impact on productivity of all 
planning policies, including cross sectional variation in LPA restrictiveness reported 
in the final panel of the table, is less conservative and has a slightly less firm 
econometric base but still we judge is likely to be a lower bound rather than an upper 
bound estimate for reasons given above. And even this figure of a total productivity 
loss of 24.9 percent makes no allowance for the impact on welfare of more restrictive 
application of planning policies simply excluding stores from local areas altogether. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The results strongly suggest that planning policies – in particular Town Centre First 
(TCF) policies – directly cause a significant reduction in both total factor productivity 
and – separately – labour productivity in retailing – at least in the case of the large 
supermarket sector. The fact that more restrictive TCF policies came earlier and have 
been substantially more rigid with respect to store locations in England than in 
Scotland or Northern Ireland provides us with in effect a form of natural experiment. 
We exploit this to estimate a DiD-model. The results of this imply a loss of TFP of 
                                                                                                                                            
England then) and reported in Cheshire and Sheppard (1986). This cheapest retail land in Darlington 
was then £1.159 million per acre compared to £17,000 for the cheapest industrial land: the most 
expensive retail land was estimated at £13.539 million per acre compared to the most expensive 
industrial land at £20,000 per acre. 
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some 9.6 percent with an additional 2.6 percent loss of labour productivity. This 
however is likely to be an underestimate since it implicitly assumes that the policies in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland were neutral with respect to town centre retail location. 
As Roger Tym and Partners (2006) makes clear, in Scotland at least, policy was 
restrictive although introduced somewhat later and formulated significantly less 
rigidly than in England. A less conservative but less firmly based estimate of the 
impact of TCF policies on total factor productivity for English stores is a loss of 16.2 
percent.  
 
We have shown that if output is measured as turnover – a measure supported by the 
fact that the store group whose data we analyse here has a firm policy of equal mark-
ups in all stores - then output rises with store size, all else equal. Store size in turn is 
affected by regulatory policies, arguably in two separate ways. Firstly, TCF policies 
in England that became very rigid after 1996 directly affected store size. Stores built 
since 1996 are significantly smaller compared to stores that opened prior to TCF 
policies becoming rigidly binding on the choice of site location, and this despite 
significant population decentralization and continued increase in car ownership and 
the use of more and larger lorries. Based on very conservative assumptions about the 
counterfactual, our simulations imply that store sales are 2.6 percent lower as a 
consequence of this adverse effect on the size of English stores since 1996.  
 
Secondly, our evidence indicates that, independently of the central government’s TCF 
policies the restrictiveness with which planning policies operate varies significantly 
by jurisdiction and the more restrictive local regimes not only made stores smaller 
(and so less productive) but tended to exclude them altogether. This was shown by 
using the mean 1979-2008 refusal rate for major residential developments for each 
LPA as a measure of ‘regulatory restrictiveness’. One concern with the refusal rate 
measure is that it may be endogenous and that, as a consequence, the estimated impact 
of regulation on floorspace may be biased. In order to address this concern we employ 
an IV approach and exploit exogenous variation derived from the political 
composition of local councils in charge of planning policy in order to identify the 
causal and unbiased effect of regulation on store size. Doing this we have reasonably 
established that more restrictive planning regimes generate smaller stores and smaller 
stores generate less output, all else hold constant. Our simulations imply that if all the 
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stores in our sample were located in jurisdictions where policy was applied as in the 
least restrictive English local planning authority – still very restrictive by international 
standards – their combined output would be 6.1 percent higher on average. Adding 
this effect to the direct loss in productivity generated by the TCF policies in England 
since the late 1980s and the indirect effect of the same policies on store size, indicates 
an aggregate loss of productivity of at least 18.3 percent and more likely 24.9 percent 
since the late 1980s. 
 
Following the financial crisis and recession of 2007 there is talk of a ‘lost decade’ of 
output being imposed on European economies. What we have shown here is that in 
one very important sector of the British economy – supermarkets and groceries – 
policy has imposed more than a lost decade of output all on its own. 
 
This, of course, is a gross economic cost, not a measure of net costs. Restrictive 
planning policies may also generate benefits not measured here. When TCF policy 
was introduced it was claimed that town centre locations for retail would improve 
sustainability by allowing ‘linked trips’ and use of public transport and would ensure 
access to shops for poorer households who were less likely to have cars (ODPM, 
2004). The two benefits the policy was expected to generate, therefore, were a 
reduction in the carbon footprint of retail and an improvement in equity. One further 
intended step in our research is to rigorously evaluate these expected benefits – 
particularly the carbon footprint impact of TCF policy.  
 
The great advantage of estimating a credible, if lower bound value for the total cost of 
planning policies in terms of retail productivity, however, is that even if it fails to 
estimate any benefits, it should improve policy decisions. Planning policy may 
generate some gains, such as preserving the existing appearance of town centres (even 
if, as Sadun, 2008, shows, it reduces employment of independent retailers in town 
centres) but it would seem important to have an estimate of the corresponding costs 
associated with such benefits. In particular it should help to think more systematically 
about what precisely such benefits might be and whether they could be achieved at 
lower cost to output and productivity. 
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 TABLES  
Table I 
Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Store-level dataset (Tables II, III and A.1) 
Weekly sales (£) 357 921115 406300 73978 2056014 
Employment (FTE) 357 213 85 32 471 
Net floorspace (sq. ft.) 357 46710 17352 8313 101091 
Gross floorspace (sq. ft.) 357 81633 31095 15076 180000 
Storage area (sq. ft.) 357 34923 15785 4410 107412 
Net/gross floorspace (ratio) 357 0.58 0.07 0.33 0.83 
Non-food format (dummy) 357 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Mezzanine (dummy) 357 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Years since first opening 357 14.4 10.5 1 43 
Total weekly opening hours 357 119 29 64 168 
Population within 10 minute drive 
time 357 81226 43706 5532 229246 
Car ownership share within 15 
minute drive time 357 0.70 0.08 0.45 0.88 
Competition variable 1) 357 4.97 3.49 0.29 23.30 
Av. FT male weekly earnings in £ 357 579.1 84.0 390.6 1104.4 
Refusal rate for major residential 
projects, 1979-2008 2) 254 0.22 0.073 0.084 0.50 
Share Labour seats, 2000-2007 2)/3) 254 0.38 0.23 0 0.94 
Local authority-level dataset (Table IV) 
Store present 351 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Number of stores 351 0.77 0.95 0 6 
Refusal rate of major residential 
projects, 1979-2008 351 0.25 0.086 0.073 0.51 
Share Labour seats, 2000-2007 3) 351 0.26 0.24 0 0.94 
Total number of households  
in LA, 2001 351 58087 38514 10463 390792 
Male nominal earnings FT, 2001 351 468.4 83.8 305.4 819 
Notes: 1) Estimated by applying a distance decay function to the five nearest stores from each of the two main 
competing retail groups. 2) Sample restricted to food format stores in England (Table III). Share Labour seats 
based on local election years 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007. 3) The years 2001 and 2005 are excluded 
as local elections coincided with General Elections. 
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Table II 
Difference-in-Difference Specifications 
 
 Dependent variable: Log(total sales) 
 Diff-in-diff: pre/post 1988 Diff-in-diff: pre/post 1996 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
England -0.0470 -0.0881 -0.134* -0.00964 -0.0862 0.173*** 
 
(0.0678) (0.0697) (0.0771) (0.0372) (0.0702) (0.0443) 
England × Post 1988 -0.0798** -0.0909** -0.0968**    
 
(0.0394) (0.0393) (0.0463)    
Post 1988 0.0483 0.0983** 0.283*    
 
(0.0363) (0.0475) (0.155)    
England × Post 1996    -0.0832** -0.0881** -0.0947* 
 
   (0.0372) (0.0376) (0.0488) 
Post 1996    0.0328 0.0635 0.221 
 
   (0.0348) (0.0544) (0.163) 
Years since opening  0.00978**   0.00777  
 
 (0.00405)   (0.00604)  
Years since opening  -0.000203*   -0.000185  
squared  (0.000111)   (0.000133)  
Year of open. 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Net floorspace 0.123* 0.152** 0.179** 0.133* 0.149** 0.182** 
 
(0.0719) (0.0742) (0.0743) (0.0724) (0.0745) (0.0748) 
Storage area -0.000699 0.0130 -0.0195 0.00126 0.00484 -0.0234 
 
(0.0317) (0.0333) (0.0355) (0.0314) (0.0322) (0.0351) 
Employment 0.916*** 0.845*** 0.860*** 0.896*** 0.859*** 0.862*** 
 
(0.0665) (0.0741) (0.0704) (0.0676) (0.0762) (0.0706) 
Mezzanine -0.0388 -0.0337 -0.0441 -0.0317 -0.0313 -0.0473 
dummy (0.0304) (0.0301) (0.0345) (0.0303) (0.0299) (0.0351) 
Non-food format -0.208** -0.253** -0.236*** -0.221** -0.246** -0.227*** 
dummy (0.0952) (0.0989) (0.0805) (0.0956) (0.0981) (0.0807) 
Hours 0.000926* 0.000975** 0.000719 0.00103** 0.00104** 0.000787* 
 
(0.000481) (0.000465) (0.000468) (0.000453) (0.000459) (0.000466) 
Population within  0.0803*** 0.0699*** 0.0619*** 0.0765*** 0.0701*** 0.0605*** 
10 min. drive time (0.0213) (0.0215) (0.0233) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0230) 
Competition -0.00406 -0.00507 -0.00443 -0.00442 -0.00490 -0.00440 
 
(0.00342) (0.00329) (0.00369) (0.00328) (0.00329) (0.00369) 
TTWA FEs and 
constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 331 331 331 331 331 331 
R-squared 0.981 0.982 0.986 0.981 0.982 0.986 
Notes: All regressors (except hours, car ownership, competition and dummies) are logged so that they can be 
interpreted as elasticities. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Stores in Wales 
are dropped from the sample. 
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Table III 
Does planning restrictiveness affect the net floorspace area of stores? 
(TSLS estimates using share of Labour seats at the local councils as instrument) 
 
 
OLS TSLS: Second stage Dependent variable: log (net floorspace area) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Refusal rate:  
major residential projects 
-0.689* -1.088* -1.819* -1.905* 
(0.368) (0.582) (1.002) (0.996) 
Population within 10 minutes 
drive time 
 
 
0.111 0.0767 
 
 
(0.0756) (0.0749) 
Competition 
 
 
-0.0167* -0.0162* 
 
 
(0.0101) (0.00995) 
Years since opening 
 
  
0.0299** 
 
  
(0.0152) 
Years since opening squared 
 
  
-0.000816* 
 
  
(0.000503) 
TTWA FEs No No Yes Yes 
Observations 217 217 217 217 
  
TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable: refusal rate 
Share Labour seats 
 
-0.190*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 
  
(0.015) (0.031) (0.031) 
Controls and FEs (included instr.) 
 
No Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 
 
165.9 27.7 27.5 
Notes: Instrumented variable in bold. The sample is restricted to food format stores that are located 
in England. The refusal rate is calculated as the ratio of declined major residential project applications 
to the total number of applications and averaged over 1979-2008 (the period for which regulation data 
exist). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Stock-Yogo weak ID 
test critical values: 10% maximal IV size: 16.38, 15% maximal IV size: 8.96, 20% maximal IV size: 
6.66 and 25% maximal IV size: 5.53. 
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Table IV 
Determinants of store presence propensity and  
number of stores in local authority 
 
Dependent variable: Presence of store in LA Number of stores in LA 
  (1) OLS (2) TSLS (3) OLS (4) TSLS 
Refusal rate:  
major residential projects 
-2.455*** -3.877*** -3.117*** -3.879*** 
(0.514) (0.745) (0.998) (1.196) 
Number of households in  
local authority, 2001 
1.92e-06* 9.54e-07 1.02e-05*** 9.73e-06*** 
(9.78e-07) (7.46e-07) (1.99e-06) (1.59e-06) 
TTWA FEs and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 351 351 351 351 
Adjusted R-squared 0.516  0.628  
 
TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable: refusal rate (major residential projects) 
Share Labour seats 
 -0.189***  -0.189*** 
 (0.0220)  (0.0220) 
Controls and FEs (included instr.)  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.  74.0  74.0 
Notes: Instrumented variable in bold. The refusal rate is calculated as the ratio of declined major 
residential project applications to the total number of applications and averaged over 1979-2008 (the 
period for which regulation data exist). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size: 16.38, 15% maximal IV size: 
8.46, 20% maximal IV size: 6.66 and 25% maximal IV size: 5.53. 
 
  
36
  
 
Table V 
Quantitative estimates of planning policy impact on retail output 
 
Effect Underlying 
specifications 
Output reduction  
(ceteris paribus) Notes 
[1] Impact of TCF policy via affecting 
TFP directly (relative impact England vs. 
Scotland/NI): 
Difference-in-difference estimates of impact 
of TCF policy: Scotland/Northern Ireland  
vs. England 
 Average of 
T2(3+6) -9.6% 
Lower bound estimate of 
loss in TFP due to TCF 
policy (assuming 
Scotland/NI are 
unconstrained) 
[2] Impact of TCF policy in England via 
affecting TFP directly (absolute impact of 
TCF policy in England) based on effect of 
store age on output: 
Estimate of impact of TCF policy in 
England based on effect of store age on 
output: Representative store built in 2006 
but annual productivity growth since 1986 
assumed at estimated rate for 1966-1986 
(counterfactual) vs. representative store 
built in 2006 
TA.1 (2) -16.2% 
Loss in TFP due to TCF 
policy in England (estimate 
of total effect of impact in 
England using alternative 
estimates) 
[3] Impact of TCF policy via affecting 
store size: 
Compare representative store in 2008 with 
net floor area assumed to be the average of 
1990-1995 (pre-TCF policy) with 
representative store in 2008 with net floor 
area assumed to be the average of 1996 
onwards (post-TCF policy) 
 
Average of 
T2(3+6) 
 
-2.6% 
 
Loss in labour 
productivity due to 
reduction in store size as 
consequence of TCF policy 
[4] Impact of local regulatory 
restrictiveness on store size and via store 
size on output: 
Compare situation where all stores in 
sample are assumed to have lowest level of 
regulatory restrictiveness (Middlesbrough) 
vs. an average level of regulatory 
restrictiveness (regression sample average) 
Av. T2(3+6) 
+ T3 (4) -6.1% 
Loss in labour 
productivity due to local 
regulatory constraints 
Total Impact of planning policies  
(more conservative assumptions) [1]+[3]+[4] -18.3% 
Assumes that TCF policies 
in Scotland and NI had no 
significant adverse effects. 
To the extent that TCF 
policies in Scotland and NI 
also had adverse effects, the 
18.3% is an underestimate 
of the true negative impact 
Total Impact of planning policies 
(less conservative assumptions) [2]+[3]+[4] -24.9% 
Use [2] instead of [1] for 
calculation of total impact 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure I 
Number of applications for major retail developments, 1979-2008  
(mean per local planning authority per year) 
 
 Source: Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
 
Figure II 
Relationship between age of store and net floor area  
(measured at sample mean; England only) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 
Determinants of store-level total sales 
 
 Dependent variable: Log(total sales) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
England 
No FEs 
England 
With FEs 
Scotland  
and NI 
No FEs 
Scotland  
and NI 
With FEs 
Net floorspace 0.158** 0.151* 0.200** 0.156 
 
(0.0611) (0.0845) (0.0921) (0.165) 
Storage area -0.0137 0.0109 -0.0289 0.0239 
 
(0.0253) (0.0361) (0.0646) (0.0985) 
Employment 0.847*** 0.841*** 0.932*** 0.885*** 
 
(0.0615) (0.0859) (0.113) (0.152) 
Mezzanine -0.0378* -0.0444 -0.0281 0.00882 
dummy (0.0206) (0.0349) (0.0407) (0.0671) 
Non-food format -0.265*** -0.254** -0.185 -0.199 
dummy (0.0909) (0.121) (0.118) (0.170) 
Hours 0.000899** 0.00106** 0.00150** 0.00114 
 
(0.000362) (0.000512) (0.000595) (0.000988) 
Years since opening 0.0121*** 0.00992** -0.00898 0.00242 
 
(0.00303) (0.00428) (0.00868) (0.0120) 
Years since opening -0.000267*** -0.000221* 0.000246 -8.06e-05 
squared (7.42e-05) (0.000117) (0.000248) (0.000355) 
Population within  0.0468*** 0.0657** 0.0895*** 0.0656 
10 min. drive time (0.0159) (0.0264) (0.0249) (0.0511) 
Competition -0.00524** -0.00558 -0.0176** -0.00483 
 
0.158** 0.151* 0.200** 0.156 
TTWA FEs No Yes No Yes 
Northern Ireland    0.0142 
 
   (0.101) 
Observations 269 269 62 62 
R-squared 0.965 0.980 0.968 0.986 
Notes: All regressors (except hours, car ownership, competition and dummies) are logged so that 
they can be interpreted as elasticities. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. The specifications reported in Columns (5) and (6) were also re-estimated including all 
stores located in Wales. Results are qualitatively very similar. In particular, the coefficients on year 
since opening and year since opening squared are completely statistically insignificant as well. 
 
  
39
  
 
UNPUBLISED WEB-APPENDIX 
Table U.1 
Difference-in-Difference specifications with additional controls  
(local car ownership-share and earnings) 
 Dependent variable: Log(total sales) 
 Diff-in-diff: pre/post 1988 Diff-in-diff: pre/post 1996 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
England 0.0305 -0.0144 -0.0911 0.0169 -0.00729 -0.0976 
 
(0.0810) (0.0813) (0.0887) (0.0778) (0.0837) (0.0891) 
England × Post 1988 -0.0748* -0.0858** -0.0930**    
 
(0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0449) 
   
Post 1988 0.0422 0.0878* 0.167    
 
(0.0370) (0.0472) (0.172)    
England × Post 1996    -0.0784** -0.0828** -0.0903* 
 
   (0.0379) (0.0382) (0.0485) 
Post 1996    0.0275 0.0519 0.179 
 
   (0.0361) (0.0547) (0.170) 
Years since opening  0.00933**   0.00686  
 
 (0.00399)   (0.00600)  
Years since opening  -0.000198*   -0.000168  
squared  (0.000110)   (0.000132)  
Year of open. 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Net floorspace 0.125* 0.152** 0.175** 0.135* 0.148* 0.179** 
 
(0.0735) (0.0757) (0.0754) (0.0738) (0.0762) (0.0760) 
Storage area -0.00247 0.0104 -0.0206 8.48e-05 0.00350 -0.0242 
 
(0.0312) (0.0328) (0.0353) (0.0310) (0.0317) (0.0351) 
Employment 0.920*** 0.853*** 0.870*** 0.899*** 0.867*** 0.870*** 
 
(0.0680) (0.0753) (0.0711) (0.0687) (0.0778) (0.0714) 
Mezzanine -0.0358 -0.0313 -0.0421 -0.0289 -0.0288 -0.0450 
dummy (0.0307) (0.0305) (0.0349) (0.0307) (0.0305) (0.0355) 
Non-food format -0.206** -0.248** -0.227*** -0.218** -0.242** -0.221*** 
dummy (0.0977) (0.102) (0.0830) (0.0977) (0.101) (0.0832) 
Hours 0.000883* 0.000929** 0.000677 0.000980** 0.000982** 0.000750 
 
(0.000477) (0.000465) (0.000463) (0.000452) (0.000459) (0.000463) 
Population within  0.0783*** 0.0681*** 0.0581** 0.0746*** 0.0690*** 0.0581** 
10 min. drive time (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0244) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0241) 
Car ownership share  -0.00138 -0.00134 -0.00140 -0.00137 -0.00127 -0.00116 
share within 15 min.  (0.00179) (0.00175) (0.00195) (0.00178) (0.00175) (0.00196) 
Competition -0.00439 -0.00537 -0.00486 -0.00478 -0.00525 -0.00473 
 
(0.00346) (0.00334) (0.00386) (0.00333) (0.00336) (0.00388) 
Average FT male  -0.176** -0.158** -0.0806 -0.176** -0.168** -0.0885 
weekly earnings (0.0789) (0.0741) (0.0832) (0.0751) (0.0736) (0.0811) 
TTWA FEs and 
constant 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 331 331 331 331 331 331 
R-squared 0.981 0.982 0.986 0.982 0.982 0.986 
Notes: All regressors (except hours, car ownership, competition and dummies) are logged so that they can be 
interpreted as elasticities. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Stores in 
Wales are dropped from the sample. 
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Table U.2 
Determinants of net floor area with additional controls  
(local car ownership-share and earnings) 
 
TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable:  
log (net floorspace area) 
 
(1) (2) 
Refusal rate:  -1.088* -2.038* 
major residential projects (0.582) (1.205) 
Population within 10 minutes  0.121* 
drive time  (0.0729) 
Car ownership share   0.00575 
share within 15 min.   (0.00621) 
Competition  -0.0150 
 
 (0.0103) 
Average FT male   0.254 
weekly earnings  (0.314) 
TTWA FEs No Yes 
Observations 217 217 
 
TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable: refusal rate 
(major residential projects) 
Share Labour seats -0.190*** -0.139*** 
 (0.015) (0.030) 
Controls and FEs (included instr.) No Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 165.9 21.3 
Notes: Instrumented variable in bold. The sample is restricted to food format stores 
that are located in England. The refusal rate is calculated as the ratio of declined major 
residential project applications to the total number of applications and averaged over 
1979-2008 (the period for which regulation data exist). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 
10% maximal IV size: 16.38, 15% maximal IV size: 8.96, 20% maximal IV size: 6.66 
and 25% maximal IV size: 5.53. 
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Table U.3 
Determinants of store presence propensity and number of stores  
in local authority (with local earnings control) 
 
Dependent variable: Presence of store in LA Number of stores in LA 
  
(1)  
OLS 
(2)  
TSLS (2nd stage) 
(3)  
OLS 
(4)  
TSLS (2nd stage) 
Refusal rate:  -2.529*** -3.858*** -3.247*** -3.848*** 
major residential projects (0.510) (0.733) (0.996) (1.175) 
Number of households in local  2.05e-06** 1.18e-06 1.05e-05*** 1.01e-05*** 
authority, 2001 (9.97e-07) (7.31e-07) (2.00e-06) (1.56e-06) 
Average FT male weekly -0.000793 -0.000946* -0.00139 -0.00146* 
earnings, 2001 (0.000636) (0.000506) (0.000999) (0.000777) 
TTWA FEs and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 351 351 351 351 
Adj. R-squared 0.522  0.632  
 
TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable: refusal rate (major residential projects) 
Share Labour seats  -0.190  -0.190 
  (0.221)  (0.221) 
Controls and FEs (included 
instr.)  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.  73.5  73.5 
Notes: Instrumented variable in bold. The refusal rate is calculated as the ratio of declined major 
residential project applications to the total number of applications and averaged over 1979-2008 (the 
period for which regulation data exist). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size: 16.38, 15% maximal IV size: 
8.46, 20% maximal IV size: 6.66 and 25% maximal IV size: 5.53. 
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Table U.4 
Determinants of store-level total sales with additional controls  
(local car ownership-share and earnings) 
 
 Dependent variable: Log(total sales) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
England 
No FEs 
England 
With FEs 
Scotland  
and NI 
No FEs 
Scotland  
and NI 
With FEs 
Net floorspace 0.158** 0.152* 0.207** 0.160 
 
(0.0640) (0.0862) (0.0914) (0.175) 
Storage area -0.0132 0.0128 -0.0439 0.00563 
 
(0.0256) (0.0355) (0.0741) (0.121) 
Employment 0.845*** 0.841*** 0.944*** 0.918*** 
 
(0.0632) (0.0870) (0.108) (0.179) 
Mezzanine -0.0376* -0.0418 -0.0381 0.0115 
dummy (0.0209) (0.0354) (0.0470) (0.0733) 
Non-food format -0.265*** -0.252** -0.186 -0.182 
dummy (0.0917) (0.124) (0.118) (0.174) 
Hours 0.000921** 0.00108** 0.00150** 0.000907 
 
(0.000361) (0.000511) (0.000586) (0.00128) 
Years since opening 0.0122*** 0.00971** -0.00972 0.00390 
 
(0.00303) (0.00420) (0.00905) (0.0128) 
Years since opening -0.000269*** -0.000214* 0.000263 -0.000130 
squared (7.36e-05) (0.000116) (0.000263) (0.000372) 
Population within  0.0529*** 0.0669** 0.0734** 0.0470 
10 min. drive time (0.0186) (0.0273) (0.0275) (0.0555) 
Car ownership share  0.000746 -0.00107 -0.00241 -0.00393 
share within 15 min.  (0.000945) (0.00200) (0.00218) (0.00460) 
Competition -0.00517** -0.00584* -0.0157* -0.00559 
 
(0.00243) (0.00351) (0.00930) (0.0160) 
Average FT male  -0.00713 -0.176* -0.0899 -0.120 
weekly earnings (0.0488) (0.0896) (0.106) (0.224) 
TTWA FEs No Yes No Yes 
Northern Ireland    0.0142 
 
   (0.101) 
Observations 269 269 62 62 
R-squared 0.966 0.980 0.969 0.987 
Notes: All regressors (except hours, car ownership, competition and dummies) are logged so that 
they can be interpreted as elasticities. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. The specifications reported in Columns (5) and (6) were also re-estimated including all 
stores located in Wales. Results are qualitatively very similar. In particular, the coefficients on year 
since opening and year since opening squared are completely statistically insignificant as well. 
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